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Despite major neuroscientific advances in the past two decades and parallel conceptual 
refinement in evolutionary theory, personality-in-politics inquiry remains adrift, divorced from 
these broader spheres of scientific knowledge. This paper reviews the neurobiological substrates 
of three major domains of evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology relevant to political 
personality assessment and the psychological examination of political leaders; furnishes a 
context and set of guiding ideas to revitalize the study of the person as biopsychosocial entity in 
politics; advances a generative theory of personality and political leadership performance; and 
proposes an agenda for advancing personality-in-politics and leadership inquiry, informed by 
insights derived from the contextually adjacent fields of behavioral neuroscience and 
evolutionary ecology. 
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David Buss (1999) has bluntly asserted that “theories of personality inconsistent with 
evolutionary principles stand little or no chance of being correct” (p. 52). George Marcus (2002), 
pointing to recent advances in neuroscience, has issued a call for “entirely new theories, new 
concepts, and new data” capable of rehabilitating political psychology from the limited, though 
currently dominant, social-psychological and cognitive conceptual frameworks (pp. 100–102). 
“Conventional wisdom,” he notes,  
 
whether as to substantive conclusions, methodologies, or typologies, is, by definition, 
well entrenched. As such, the “state of the field” often becomes resistant to self-
examination due to our comfort with prevailing accounts. … Still, however circumspect 
we must be in advancing our current understandings, we should not shy away from the 
obligation to do an even better job of self-examination, for how else can political 
psychology become that scientific enterprise? (p. 104) 
 
Marcus’s agenda focuses on “putting emotion in the center of the study of human 
judgment” (Marcus, 2002, p. 101; see also Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000); however, his 
incisive critique is especially relevant to the study of political personality and leadership. For 
example, his studies of emotion in politics apply directly to the psychological assessment of 
presidential candidates (Marcus, 1988) and political participation in the context of presidential 
campaigns (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). 
 
In our judgment, much of political personology, no less personality psychology as a 
whole, remains adrift, divorced from broader spheres of scientific knowledge — that is, isolated 
from firmly grounded, universal principles — leading us to continue building the patchwork quilt 
of concepts and data domains that characterize the field. Preoccupied with but a small part of the 
larger puzzle of nature, we may fail to draw on the rich possibilities to be found in parallel 
realms of scientific pursuit. With few exceptions, cohering concepts that would connect the 
subject domain of political personology to parallel domains in the natural sciences have not been 
adequately formulated. 
 
Personological features may be partitioned conceptually for pragmatic or scientific 
purposes, but they are segments of an inseparable biopsychosocial entity. To take this view is not 
to argue that different spheres of scientific inquiry must be collapsed or even equated, but that 
there may be value in seeking a single, overarching conceptual system that interconnects 
ostensibly diverse subjects such as physics, biology, and psychology (Millon, 1990; 
E. O. Wilson, 1998). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to furnish both a context and a set of guiding ideas that may 
enrich our study of the person-as-biopsychosocial-entity in politics, informed by contextually 
adjacent fields such as behavioral neuroscience and evolutionary theory. 
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An Agenda for Advancing Personality-in-Politics Inquiry  
in a Neuroscientific, “Postcognitive Era” 
 
In the present paper, the terms personality and politics are employed in Fred Greenstein’s (1992) 
narrowly construed sense. Politics, by this definition, “refers to the politics most often studied by 
political scientists — that of civil government and of the extra-governmental processes that more 
or less directly impinge upon government, such as political parties” and campaigns. Personality, 
as narrowly construed in political psychology, “excludes political attitudes and opinions … and 
applies only to nonpolitical personal differences” (p. 107). 
 
From an evolutionary–ecological perspective, personality constitutes ontogenetic, 
manifest, adaptive styles of thinking, feeling, acting, and relating to others, shaped by the 
interaction of latent, phylogenetic, biological endowment and social experience. This construal is 
consistent with the contemporary view of personality as  
 
a complex pattern of deeply embedded psychological characteristics that are largely 
nonconscious and not easily altered, expressing themselves automatically in almost every 
facet of functioning. Intrinsic and pervasive, these traits emerge from a complicated 
matrix of biological dispositions and experiential learnings, and ultimately comprise the 
individual’s distinctive pattern of perceiving, feeling, thinking, coping, and behaving. 
(Millon, 1996, p. 4) 
 
For political personality inquiry to remain a thriving scholarly endeavor, it will need to 
account, at a minimum, for the patterning of personality variables “across the entire matrix of the 
person” (Millon & Davis, 2000, pp. 2, 65), with full recognition of the neurobiological and 
evolutionary–ecological foundations of human behavior. Moreover, it will be incumbent upon 
political personologists to advance a generative theory of personality and political leadership 
performance. 
 
The Need to Proceed From Description of Observable Phenomena  
to Theoretical Systematization 
 
Ultimately, scholarly progress in personality-in-politics inquiry hinges on its success in 
advancing from the “natural history stage of inquiry” to a “stage of deductively formulated 
theory” (Northrop, 1947). The intuitive psychologist’s “ability to ‘sense’ the correctness of a 
psychological insight” (Millon, 2003, p. 5) presents an easily overlooked obstacle to progress in 
political-personological inquiry. Inadequate theoretical systematization is a conceptual 
shortcoming even more fundamental than the problem alluded to by Marcus (2002) in noting 
that, prior to the development of neuroscientific measurement technologies, the question of “how 
the brain generates emotion, reason, consciousness, memory, and so forth … [had] been driven 
by the unreliable and often misleading devices of external observation, introspection, and self-
report” (p. 100). 
 
According to philosopher of science Carl Hempel (1965), in the early stages of a 
scientific discipline’s development investigators primarily strive “to describe the phenomena 
under study and to establish simple empirical generalizations concerning them,” using terms that 
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“permit the description of those aspects of the subject matter which are ascertainable fairly 
directly by observation” (p. 140). Margaret Hermann’s (1974, 1980) early work in the area of 
political personality and leadership illustrates this initial stage of scientific development. In the 
words of Hempel (1965), 
 
The shift toward theoretical systematization is marked by the introduction of new, 
“theoretical” terms, which refer to various theoretically postulated entities, their 
characteristics, and the processes in which they are involved; all of these are more or less 
removed from the level of directly observable things and events. (p. 140) 
 
Hermann’s (1987) proposal of a model signifying how leaders’ observable personal 
characteristics “link to form role orientations to foreign affairs” (p. 162) represents considerable 
progress in this direction; however, it lacks the systematic import that recent advances in 
evolutionary ecology and neuroscience stand to offer personality-in-politics inquiry. 
 
The Need for Systematic Import 
 
Theoretical systematization and empirical import (operational definitions) are necessary 
but not sufficient for scientific progress. 
 
To be scientifically useful a concept must lend itself to the formulation of general laws or 
theoretical principles which reflect uniformities in the subject matter under study, and 
which thus provide a basis for explanation, prediction, and generally scientific 
understanding. (Hempel, 1965, p. 146) 
 
The most striking instance of this principle of systematic import, according to Hempel 
(1965), is the periodic system of the elements, which permitted highly specific, accurate 
predictions (p. 147). Hempel chronicled similar scientific progress in biological taxonomic 
systems, which proceeded from primitive classification based on observable characteristics to a 
more advanced phylogenetic–evolutionary basis (p. 149). 
 
For personality-in-politics inquiry to continue advancing as a scholarly discipline, it will 
have to come to grips with the canon of systematic import. At base, this means that theoretical 
systematizations cannot be constructed on the foundation of precisely those personal 
characteristics from which they were originally inferred (see Immelman, 2003, pp. 604–605; 
Millon, 2003, pp. 4–5). To do so would be to regress to the pitfall of circularity implicit in 
Greenstein’s (1992) critique that  
 
single-case and typological studies alike make inferences about the inner quality of 
human beings … from outer manifestations — their past and present environments … 
and the pattern over time of their political responses. … They then use those inferred 
constructs to account for the same kind of phenomena from which they were inferred — 
responses in situational contexts. The danger of circularity is obvious, but tautology can 
be avoided by reconstructing personality from some response patterns and using the 
reconstruction to explain others. (pp. 120–121) 
 
Better still, would be for personologists to reconstruct the scaffolding of personality from its 
foundations in the adjacent, more advanced fields of neuroscience and evolutionary ecology. 
Research Agenda for Political Personality      4 
 
 
The Need for a Generative, Neuroscientifically Informed Evolutionary Theory  
of Personality and Political Performance 
 
Ideally, conceptual systems for the study of political personality and leadership 
performance should constitute a comprehensive, generative, theoretically coherent framework 
consonant with established principles in the adjacent sciences (particularly the more mature 
natural sciences; see Millon, 2003, pp. 3–8), congenial with respect to accommodating a 
diversity of politically relevant personal characteristics, and capable of reliably predicting 
meaningful political outcomes. The problem bedeviling contemporary personality-in-politics 
inquiry is more profound than the precarious perch of leadership performance theories on a 
fragmented foundation of primitive, observationally based personality theories — 
neuroscientifically informed though they may be. In his critique of postwar research directions in 
political psychology, James Davies (1973) declared:  
 
There is … a kind of atrophy of theory and research that can help us link observable acts 
with their deeply and generally antecedent causes in the human organism, notably the 
nervous and endocrine systems. Aristotle sought such relationships. So did Hobbes, 
whose Leviathan (1651) founded its analysis of political institutions on a theory of 
human nature.  And likewise, Lasswell has sought to relate fundamental determinants to 
observable effects — and vice versa. (p. 26) 
 
In some respects, personality-in-politics inquiry has regressed in the past three decades; a 
basic necessity in addressing Davies’s critique, albeit belatedly, is to draw a clear distinction 
between “true,” theoretically deduced nosologies and those that provide a mere explanatory 
summary of known observations and inferences (see Millon, 1990, p. 105). The fundamental 
importance of this necessary condition for scientific progress is aptly conveyed in Hempel’s 
(1965) proposition that scientific classification ought to have an “objective existence in nature, 
… ‘carving nature at the joints,’ in contradistinction to ‘artificial’ classifications, in which the 
defining characteristics have few explanatory or predictive connections with other traits” 
(p. 147). Hempel’s dictum accurately captures the essence of scientific advancement, which is 
epitomized by taxonomic systems “based on theoretical concepts” progressively displacing 
“classifications defined by reference to manifest, observable characteristics (Hempel, 1965, 
pp. 148–149). 
 
Greenstein (1987), pointing to the work of Steve Gangestad and Mark Snyder (1985) and 
Leslie Morey (1985), acknowledged the substantial progress since the publication of his seminal 
Personality and Politics (1969) “in grounding complex psychological typologies empirically,” 
yet pessimistically proclaimed that “complex typologies are not easily constructed and 
documented” (Greenstein, 1987, p. xiv). As we show in this paper, recent advances in 
evolutionary theory, buttressed by flourishing neuroscientific understanding of the biological 
substrates of affect, behavior, and cognition at the molecular level, afford a timely resolution of 
this dilemma. Fundamentally, it offers the promise of “carving nature at the joints” by suggesting 
a generative framework for a model of political personality and leadership founded upon latent 
phylogenetic–evolutionary principles rather than on observable characteristics and surface 
features. 
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Ironically, despite major advances in behavioral neuroscience, evolutionary ecology, 
personality research, and clinical science in the past two decades (see Millon, 2003), personality-
in-politics inquiry has stagnated, with little cross-pollination from these adjacent disciplines. In 
our judgment, that ennui has run its course; at the turn of the century, personality-in-politics 
inquiry is poised on the threshold of a new personology. The payoff, should political psychology 
successfully rise to the challenge, is progression from a primitive, “developmental” stage of 
scientific development to a paradigmatic, “normal science” (Kuhn, 1970) of political 
personology. 
 
From Cognitive Revolution to Evolutionary Neuroscience 
 
On the crest of major breakthroughs in evolutionary biology during the preceding 
quarter-century, the emerging evolutionary perspective in psychology since the mid-1980s (see 
D. M. Buss, 1999; Millon, 1990, 2003) represents the first major theoretical shift in the discipline 
since the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. Marcus (2002) is quite unambiguous in 
stating, “The remarkable work now ongoing in neuroscience ends the long period of speculation 
of how the brain works” (p. 100). 
 
Conceptually, the new neuroscientifically grounded evolutionary–ecological perspective 
on personality has the integrative capacity to subsume major tenets of psychodynamic, 
behavioral, humanistic, interpersonal, cognitive, biological, and trait approaches to personality 
by grafting them onto broader spheres of scientific knowledge — domains of knowledge rooted 
in the natural sciences. Methodologically, the new personological science offers a theoretically 
coherent alternative to traditional conceptual frameworks and assessment methodologies for the 
psychological examination of political leaders (see Immelman, 1993, 1998, 2002). 
 
The Role of Evolutionary Theory as a Generative Framework  
for a Neuroscience of Personality 
 
Evolutionary social psychologist Douglas Kenrick (1994) notes that the biological roots of 
human nature, expressed in the genes, provide the link between evolution and social behavior. 
This perspective suggests that neuroscientific explanations, as proximate causes of personality 
functioning, offer an incomplete, unsatisfactory account of behavior when isolated from the 
ultimate cause explanations provided by an evolutionary framework. Thus, our discussion of the 
biological substrates of personality is embedded in evolutionary theory — not only to account for 
the adaptive functions that these biochemical substrates subserve, but as an integrative, heuristic, 
generative source for conceptualizing the attributes of personality. 
 
This power of evolutionary theory in that regard is implicit in the fact that all living 
organisms seek to avoid injury, find nourishment, and reproduce their kind if they are to survive 
and maintain their populations. Each species displays commonalities in its adaptive or survival 
style. Within each species, however, there are differences in style and differences in the success 
with which its various members adapt to the diverse and changing environments they face (see, 
for example, D. M. Buss, 1991; Simpson & Kenrick, 1996; D. S. Wilson, 1994). In these 
simplest of terms, differences among personality styles would be conceived as representing the 
more-or-less distinctive ways of adaptive functioning that the human organism exhibits as it 
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relates to its typical range of environments — including political environments and the realm of 
leadership, the locus of concern in the present endeavor. 
 
Toward an Ecology of Mind 
 
The role of evolution is most clearly grasped when paired with the principles of ecology. 
So conceived, the procession of evolution represents a series of serendipitous transformations in 
the structure of a phenomenon (e.g., elementary particle, chemical molecule, living organism) 
that appear to promote survival in both its current and future environments. Such processions 
usually stem from the consequences of either random fluctuations (such as mutations) or 
replicative reformations (e.g., recombinant mating) among an infinite number of possibilities. 
Evolution is defined when these restructurings enable a natural entity (e.g., species) or its 
subsequent variants to survive within present and succeeding ecological milieus. It is the 
continuity through time of these fluctuations and reformations that comprises the sequence we 
characterize as evolutionary progression. 
 
In recent decades, evolution-oriented psychologists and biologists have begun to explore 
how the mind may have evolved to solve the problems of basic survival, ecological adaptation, 
and species replication and diversification. These well-crafted formulations are distinctly 
different from other, more traditional models employed to characterize human functioning. 
 
The human mind is but the most recent phase in the long history of organic life; there is 
no reason to assume that the exigencies of life have differed in their essentials among early and 
current species. It would be reasonable, therefore — perhaps inevitable — that the study of the 
functions of mind be founded upon the same principles that are universally encountered in 
evolution’s progression. Thus buttressed, we should be able to build a bridge between the human 
mind and all other facets of natural science; moreover, it should provide a broad blueprint of why 
the mind engages in the functions it does, as well as what its essential purposes may be, such as 
pursuing parental affection and protection, exploring the rationale and patterns of sexual mating, 
and specifying the styles of social communication and abstract language (see Barkow, Cosmides, 
& Tooby, 1996; Simpson & Kenrick, 1996). 
 
From Phylogeny of Mind to Ontogeny of Personality 
 
A few additional words should be said concerning analogies between evolution and 
ecology on the one hand and personality on the other. During its life history (see Horn & 
Rubenstein, 1984), an organism develops an assemblage of traits that contribute to its individual 
survival and reproductive success, the two essential components of fitness formulated by 
Darwin. Such assemblages, termed complex adaptations and strategies in the literature of 
evolutionary ecology, are close biological equivalents of what psychologists have conceptualized 
as personality styles and structures. In biology, explanations of a life history strategy of 
adaptations refer primarily to biogenic variations among constituent traits, their overall 
covariance structure, and the nature and ratio of favorable to unfavorable ecological resources 
that have been available for purposes of extending longevity and optimizing reproduction. Such 
explanations are not appreciably different from those used to account for the development of 
personality styles or functions. 
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Bypassing the usual complications of analogies, a relevant and intriguing parallel may be 
drawn between the phylogenic evolution of a species’ genetic composition and the ontogenic 
development of an individual organism’s adaptive strategies (i.e., its personality style). At any 
point in time, a species possesses a limited set of genes that serve as trait potentials. Over 
succeeding generations, the frequency distribution of these genes will likely change in their 
relative proportions depending on how well the traits they undergird contribute to the species’ 
“fittedness” within its varying ecological habitats. In similar fashion, individual organisms begin 
life with a limited subset of their species’ genes and the trait potentials they subserve. Over time 
the salience of these trait potentials — not the proportion of the genes themselves — will 
become differentially prominent as the organism interacts with its environments. It “learns” from 
these experiences which of its traits “fit” best (i.e., most optimally suit its ecosystem). In 
phylogenesis, then, actual gene frequencies change during the generation-to-generation adaptive 
process, whereas in ontogenesis it is the salience or prominence of gene-based traits that changes 
as adaptive learning occurs. Parallel evolutionary processes unfold: one within the life of a 
species; the other within the life of an organism. What is seen in the individual organism is a 
shaping of latent potentials into adaptive and manifest styles of perceiving, thinking, feeling, 
acting, and relating to others; these distinctive ways of adaptation, engendered by the interaction 
of biological endowment and sociocultural experience, comprise the elements of what is termed 
personality styles. It is a formative process in a single lifetime that parallels gene redistributions 
among species during their evolutionary history. 
 
The Interdisciplinary Convergence of Evolutionary Ecology, Neuroscience, 
and Political Personology 
 
Over the past decade and more, the second author (Millon, 1990, 1996, 2003) has endeavored to 
build a clinical science of personology founded upon universal evolutionary and ecological 
foundations informed by parallel developments in the more mature adjacent sciences, most 
notably evolutionary ecology and neuroscience. The first author (Immelman, 1993, 1998, 2002, 
2003), mirroring Marcus’s (2002) concerns noted in the opening paragraphs of this paper, has 
attempted to transpose these contemporary insights from the source discipline of clinical science 
to the target discipline of political personality and leadership. 
 
To provide a conceptual background and furnish a rudimentary, though generative, model 
of personality and personality-based leadership styles, three interacting domains or spheres of 
evolutionary and ecological principles are detailed in this paper. Table 1 presents a taxonomy of 
politically relevant personality patterns derived from these principles, congruent with Axis II of 














Taxonomy of Politically Relevant Personality Patterns: 
Millon Inventory of Diagnostic Criteria 
 
 Scale 1A:  Dominant pattern 
  a. Asserting 
  b. Controlling 
  c. Aggressive (Sadistic; DSM-III-R, Appendix A) 
 Scale 1B:  Dauntless pattern 
  a. Adventurous 
  b. Dissenting 
  c. Aggrandizing (Antisocial; DSM-IV, 301.7) 
 Scale 2:  Ambitious pattern 
  a. Confident 
  b. Self-serving 
  c. Exploitative (Narcissistic; DSM-IV, 301.81) 
 Scale 3:  Outgoing pattern 
  a. Congenial 
  b. Gregarious 
  c.  Impulsive (Histrionic; DSM-IV, 301.50) 
 Scale 4:  Accommodating pattern 
  a.  Cooperative 
  b. Agreeable 
  c. Submissive (Dependent; DSM-IV, 301.6) 
 Scale 5A:  Aggrieved pattern 
  a. Unpresuming 
  b. Self-denying 
  c. Self-defeating (DSM-III-R, Appendix A) 
 Scale 5B:  Contentious pattern 
  a. Resolute 
  b. Oppositional 
  c. Negativistic (Passive-aggressive; DSM-III-R, 301.84) 
 Scale 6:  Conscientious pattern 
  a. Respectful 
  b. Dutiful 
  c. Compulsive (Obsessive-compulsive; DSM-IV, 301.4) 
 Scale 7:  Reticent pattern 
  a. Circumspect 
  b. Inhibited 
  c. Withdrawn (Avoidant; DSM-IV, 301.82) 
 Scale 8:  Retiring pattern 
  a. Reserved 
  b. Aloof 
  c. Solitary (Schizoid; DSM-IV, 301.20) 
 Scale 9:  Distrusting pattern 
  d. Suspicious 
  e. Paranoid (DSM-IV, 301.0) 
 Scale 0:  Erratic pattern 
  d. Unstable 
  e. Borderline (DSM-IV, 301.83) 
 
 Note.  Equivalent DSM terminology and codes are specified in parentheses. 
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The work of several prominent scholars at the interface of personality and neuroscience 
relates to the three polar dimensions of existence, adaptation, and replication, albeit indirectly 
and partially (see Table 2). For example, a modern conception anchored to biological 
foundations has been developed by the distinguished British psychologist Jeffrey Gray (1964, 
1973, 1975, 1991). A three-part model of temperament, matching the three-part polarity model in 
most respects, has been formulated by the American psychologists Arnold Buss and Robert 
Plomin (A. H. Buss & Plomin, 1975, 1984). Deriving inspiration from a sophisticated analysis of 
neuroanatomical substrates, the highly resourceful American psychiatrist Robert Cloninger 
(1986, 1987) has deduced a threefold schema that is coextensive with major elements of the 
present model’s three polarities. A detailed review of these and other parallels has been 
presented in several recent books by the second author (e.g., Millon, 1990, 1996). For the 
purpose of elucidating the neurobiological substrates of the personality patterns — and, 
potentially, leadership styles — derived from the three universal polarities of evolution, we will 
focus on the contributions of Gray and Cloninger. 
 
Aims of Existence: The Pain–Pleasure Polarity 
 
The two-dimensional (i.e., two linearly independent vectors) pain–pleasure polarity 
(Millon, 1990, pp. 51–64; 2003, pp. 9–14) is conceptualized in terms of, respectively, life 
enhancement (pleasure seeking) and life preservation (pain avoidance): “acts that are attracted to 
what we experientially record as pleasurable events (positive reinforcers) … [versus] behaviors 
oriented to repel events experientially characterized as painful (negative reinforcers)” (Millon, 
2003, p. 10). It appears highly likely that pleasure seeking and pain avoidance are dissociable 
and under separate neural control (Gray, 1991). The recurrence of this two-dimensional polarity 
of existence in diverse psychological domains (e.g., learned behaviors, unconscious processes, 
and emotion and motivation, as well as their biological substrates) has been elaborated elsewhere 
(Millon, 1990, pp. 51–64). 
 
Neurobiological Substrates of the Life-Preservation Attribute 
 
Gray (1975) has posited two systems serving as biological substrates of pain signals, both 
of which alert the organism to possible dangers in the environment. Those mediating the 
behavioral effects of unconditioned (instinctive?) aversive events are termed the fight–flight 
system (FFS). This system elicits defensive aggression and escape and is subserved, according to 
Gray’s pharmacological inferences, by the amygdala, the ventromedial hypothalamus, and the 
central gray of the midbrain; neurochemically, evidence suggests a difficult-to-unravel 
interaction among aminobutyric acids (e.g., gamma-aminobutyric acid, GABA), serotonin, and 
endogenous opiates (e.g., beta-endorphins). The second major source of sensitivity and action in 
response to pain signals is referred to by Gray as the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), 
consisting of the interplay of the septal–hippocampal system, its cholinergic projections and 
monoamine transmissions to the hypothalamus, and then on to the cingulate gyrus and prefrontal 
cortex. Activated by signals of punishment or nonreward, the BIS suppresses associated 
behaviors or brings about avoidance behaviors, refocuses the organism’s attention, and redirects 
activity toward alternate stimuli. 
 
 




Three Domains of Evolution and Parallel Neurobiological Personality Dimensions 
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Cloninger’s (1986, 1987) notion of harm avoidance (HA) is also congruent with the 
evolutionary attribute of life preservation. As Cloninger conceives the construct, it is a heritable 
tendency to respond intensely to signals of aversive stimuli (pain) and to learn to inhibit 
behaviors that might lead to punishment or frustrative nonreward. Those high on this dimension 
are characterized as cautious, apprehensive, and inhibited; those low on this valence would likely 
be confident, optimistic, and carefree. Cloninger subscribes essentially to Gray’s behavioral 
inhibition system concept in explicating this polarity, as well as the neuroanatomical and 
neurochemical hypotheses Gray proposed as the substrates for its pain-avoidant mechanisms. 
 
Neurobiological Substrates of the Life-Enhancement Attribute 
 
Gray’s (1975) neurobiological model references activation and inhibition systems 
(active–passive polarity) as well as reward and punishment systems (pleasure–pain polarity). 
Basing his deductions primarily on pharmacological investigations of animal behavior, Gray has 
proposed the existence of several interrelated and neuroanatomically grounded response systems 
that activate various positive and negative affects. He refers to what he terms the behavioral 
activation system (BAS) as an approach system that is subserved by the reward center uncovered 
originally by Olds and Milner (1954). Ostensibly mediated at brain stem and cerebellar levels, it 
is likely to include dopaminergic projections across various striata and is defined as responding 
to conditioned rewarding and safety stimuli by facilitating behaviors that maximize their future 
recurrence (Gray 1975). There are intricacies in the manner with which the BAS is linked to 
external stimuli and its anatomic substrates, but Gray currently views it as a system that 
subserves signals of reward, punishment relief, and pleasure. 
 
Cloninger (1986, 1987) has generated a theoretical model composed of three dimensions, 
which he terms reward dependence (RD), harm avoidance (referred to earlier), and novelty 
seeking (NS). The former and the latter are conceptually congruent with the pleasure-seeking 
polarity. Proposing that each of these dimensions reflects a heritable personality disposition, he 
relates them explicitly to specific monoaminergic pathways; for example, reward dependence is 
linked to noradrenergic activity, harm avoidance to serotonergic activity, and novelty seeking to 
dopaminergic activity. Cloninger’s reward dependence dimension reflects variance on the 
positive–gratifying–pleasure valence, whereas harm avoidance represents variance on the 
negative–pain–displeasure valence. Reward dependence is hypothesized to be a heritable 
neurobiological tendency to respond to signals of reward (pleasure), particularly verbal signals of 
social approval, sentiment, and succor, as well as to resist events that might extinguish behaviors 
previously associated with these rewards. Cloninger portrays those high on reward dependence 
as sociable, sympathetic, and pleasant; in contrast, those low on this polarity are characterized as 
detached, cool, and practical. Describing the undergirding substrate for the reward/pleasure 
valence as the behavior maintenance system (BMS), Cloninger speculates that its prime 
neuromodulator is likely to be norepinephrine, with its major ascending pathways arising in the 
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Personality Implications of the Pain–Pleasure Polarity 
 
Although the tendency to minimize pain and maximize pleasure is undoubtedly an 
inherent part of human nature, individual differences in ontogenetic development of adaptive 
strategies — the shaping of latent potentials into manifest styles of perceiving, thinking, feeling, 
acting, and relating to others, engendered by the interaction of biological endowment and 
sociocultural experience — are overtly reflected in distinctive personality styles. Reticent (e.g., 
avoidant; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, p. 260) personalities display an excessive, pain-avoidant 
preoccupation with threats to their psychic security — a hyperalertness to signs of potential 
rejection — that leads these persons pessimistically to disengage from everyday relationships 
and pleasures. At the other extreme of the pain–pleasure polarity, we find pleasure seeking, 
dauntless (e.g., antisocial; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, p. 444) personalities with a risk-taking 
attitude and little countervailing caution and prudence to avoid danger and threat. Somewhat less 
likely than dauntless personalities to throw caution to the wind are ambitious (e.g., narcissistic; 
see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 403–404) personalities, who are intermediate on both pain 
avoidance and pleasure seeking; for them, risk taking is more commonly a function of self-
enhancing hubris. 
 
Both conscientious (e.g., obsessive-compulsive; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 513) 
and contentious (e.g., negativistic; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 548–549) personalities are 
low on the pleasure-seeking polarity, experiencing relatively little joy in existence; they are more 
driven by self-preservation, though only average on the pain-avoidant polarity, which features 
less prominently in their adaptive strategy. Introverted, retiring (e.g., schizoid; see Table 1 and 
Millon, 1996, pp. 228–229) personalities are notable for weakness on both the pain-avoidant and 
pleasure-seeking polarities, thus displaying a distinctively impassive, anhedonic quality. 
 
Some personality patterns, because of characteristic experiential histories, evince marked 
polarity reversals (see Millon, 1996, pp. 496–498, 597–600). Aggrieved (e.g., self-defeating; see 
Table 1 and Millon, 1996, p. 584) personalities, rather than avoid circumstances that may prove 
painful and self-endangering, masochistically tend to set in motion situations in which they will 
come to suffer; in transmuting pain to pleasure, and thus self-inflicting rather than avoiding pain, 
they display a polarity reversal. Dominant (e.g., aggressive; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, 
pp. 482–483) personalities exhibit a different kind of polarity reversal; they avoid pain by 
preemptively imposing or inflicting it on others — a tendency most clearly discernable in the 
extreme, sadistic variant of the dominant personality pattern. For some types, such as 
accommodating (e.g., dependent; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 330–331) and outgoing (e.g., 
histrionic; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, p. 366) personalities — intermediate on both the life 
preservation and life enhancement valences — the role of pain avoidance versus pleasure 
seeking is of minimal consequence with regard to personality adaptation. 
 
The hypothesized valences of the personality patterns catalogued in Table 1, with 








Three Domains of Evolution and Associated Personality Valences 
 
 Aims of  Modes of  Strategies of 
 Existence:  Adaptation:  Replication: 
 Pain–Pleasure Passive–Active Other–Self 
 Polarity  Polarity  Polarity 
 




 Medium Low High Low Medium 
Dauntless Low Medium Low High Low High 
Ambitious Low Medium High Low Low High 
Outgoing Medium Medium Low High High Low 
Accommodating Medium Medium High Low High Low 
Aggrieved High
2
 Low High Medium Medium Low 
Contentious Medium Low Medium High Low
3
 Medium 
Conscientious Medium Low High Low High
4
 Low 
Reticent High Low Low High Medium Medium 
Retiring Low Low High Low Low Medium 
 
1 Polarity reversal 
2 Polarity reversal 
3 Conflict between polarities 
4 Conflict between polarities 
 
Political Implications of the Pain–Pleasure Polarity 
 
The pain–pleasure polarity can be invoked to hypothesize a partial genetic basis for 
individual differences in ideological (e.g., liberal–conservative) resonance. In evolutionary 
terms, liberalism can be construed as a primary concern “with improvement in the quality of life” 
and “behaviors that improve survival chances,” and conservatism as an avoidance of “actions or 
environments that threaten to jeopardize survival” (Millon & Davis, 2000, p. 58). Thus 
construed, liberals are motivated to maximize survival by seeking pleasure (life enhancement, or 
positive reinforcement), whereas conservatives seek to maximize survival by avoiding pain (life 
preservation, or negative reinforcement). In the context of personality correlates of the pain–
pleasure polarity (summarized in the preceding section), evolutionary theory would predict that 
reticent, conscientious, contentious, and dominant personalities are overrepresented among 
conservatives, that dauntless, ambitious, and possibly aggrieved personalities are overrepresented 
among liberals, and that retiring personalities are the least ideological. Furthermore, it would be 
expected that ideological resonance in accommodating and outgoing personalities is less 
determined by the pain–pleasure valence than by their strong other-nurturing orientation on the 
other–self polarity (to be discussed), which predicts liberal resonance. 
 
Data from the Minnesota Twin Study (Bouchard & McGue, 1990; Tellegen, Lykken, 
Bouchard, Wilcox, Segal, & Rich, 1988) seem to bolster the notion that ideological resonance 
has a genetic component, with a monozygotic “twin correlation” of .59 for traditionalism, an 
index of attitudes favoring conservative values. With a heritability estimate in the region of .30, 
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the heritability of conservative versus liberal attitudes appears to be similar in magnitude to that 
of the temperamental dispositions studied by A. H. Buss and Plomin (1984), namely activity 
(.25), sociability (.25), emotionality (.40), and impulsivity (.45). In contrast, the heritability 
estimate for other politically relevant attitudes, such as attitudes toward religion and racial 
integration, is near zero. (For a provocative evolutionary theory of political ideology, see Miller, 
1996.) 
 
Evolutionary theory may also shed new light on an unresolved controversy in political 
psychology, namely the debate over authoritarianism as fundamentally a rightwing phenomenon 
versus authoritarianism as an expression of both rightwing and leftwing ideological extremism. 
Hans Eysenck (1954) proposed a two-factor theory that among its classifications conceptualized 
fascists as toughminded conservatives, communists as toughminded radicals, and liberals as 
tenderminded moderates. More consonant with the pain–pleasure polarity, Silvan Tomkins’s 
(1963) polarity theory posits that people with more humanistic, leftwing ideo-affective postures 
(or scripts) both express and are more receptive to positive affect, whereas those with more 
normative rightwing scripts tend to be more responsive to negative affect. Thus, William Stone 
(1980; Stone & Smith, 1993), a leading critic of “the myth of leftwing authoritarianism,” has 
argued on empirical grounds that the evidence for leftwing authoritarianism is flawed and that 
authoritarianism is, in essence, a rightwing phenomenon. To the extent that authoritarianism can 
be construed as a life-preserving (pain-avoidant), self-enhancing rather than other-nurturing 
tendency, evolutionary theory lends support to Stone’s position. 
 
In Hermann’s (1987) conceptual scheme, a core belief component shaping a leader’s 
worldview is nationalism, which emphasizes “the importance of maintaining national honor and 
dignity” (p. 167). In evolutionary terms, the motivating aim of nationalism clearly is a 
life-preserving (pain-avoidant) orientation. 
 
The pain–pleasure dimension also provides evolutionary underpinnings for James David 
Barber’s (1992) fourfold (active/passive × positive/negative) categorization of presidential 
character, in which positivity–negativity is described in terms of enjoyment (i.e., positive affect) 
derived from political office. Positive leaders have a generally optimistic outlook and derive 
pleasure from the duties of public office, whereas negative leadership has a more pessimistic 
tone, being oriented toward pain avoidance. 
 
With respect to the neurobiology of temperament, one of the most frequently replicated 
findings in the past decade or so is the existence of two orthogonal dimensions of emotional 
response (Marcus et al., 2000). Lee Anna Clark and David Watson’s (1999) dimensions of 
Positive Emotionality (corresponding to Gray’s BAS and Cloninger’s RD) and Negative 
Emotionality (corresponding to Gray’s BIS and Cloninger’s HA) offer a useful template for 
numerous models proposed in recent years. In political psychology, Marcus and his associates 
(2000) employ the terms enthusiasm and anxiety for, respectively, the positive and negative 
emotional valences. According to Marcus (personal communication, February 16, 2002), Roger 
Masters’s work (e.g., Masters & Sullivan 1989) on nonverbal displays and political leadership 
map well onto this model (see Table 2). Specifically, Masters’s happiness/reassurance display 
corresponds to enthusiasm (positive affect), whereas the fear aspect of fear/aversion maps onto 
anxiety (negative affect). 
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Finally, the pain–pleasure polarity suggests a possible evolutionary basis for the three 
management models proposed by Richard Johnson (1974) and employed by Alexander George 
and Eric Stern (1998) to classify the policy-making structures and advisory systems favored by 
recent U.S. presidents: 
 
 Formalistic chief executives prefer “an orderly policymaking structure, … well-defined 
procedures, hierarchical lines of communication, and a structured staff system” (George & 
Stern, 1998, p. 203). In evolutionary terms, their motivating aim is to preserve life by 
minimizing pain. In addition to the high-pain/low-pleasure reticent and high-pain/average-
pleasure dominant personalities noted earlier, a formalistic management style is likely for 
contentious and conscientious personalities, both of which are average on pain avoidance, in 
conjunction with low pleasure seeking (see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 513, 548–549). 
 
 Competitive chief executives encourage “more open and uninhibited expression of diverse 
opinions, analysis, and advice” and tolerate or encourage “organizational ambiguity, 
overlapping jurisdictions, and multiple channels of communication to and from the 
president” (George & Stern, 1998, p. 203). In evolutionary terms, their motivating aim is to 
enhance life by maximizing pleasure. In addition to the high-pleasure/low pain dauntless 
personality noted earlier, a competitive management style is likely for the ambitious 
personality, which is average on pleasure seeking, in conjunction with relatively low pain 
avoidance (see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 403–404). 
 
 Collegial chief executives attempt to benefit from the advantages of both the competitive and 
formalistic approaches while avoiding their pitfalls. Thus, they strive for “diversity and 
competition in the policymaking system,” balanced by “encouraging cabinet officers and 
advisers to identify at least partly with the presidential perspective” and “encouraging 
collegial participation” (George & Stern, 1998, p. 203). In evolutionary terms, collegial 
executives are intermediate on both the pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidant dimensions of the 
pain–pleasure polarity, and strongly other-oriented on the other–self polarity (to be 
discussed). The accommodating and outgoing personality patterns are noted for being 
average on both of these dimensions, in conjunction with strong other-directedness (see 
Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 330–331, 366). 
 
The systematic import (to be discussed) of a generative theory is implicit in the 
suggestion that Johnson’s (1974) management model fails to account for at least two additional 
(hypothesized) executive styles: complex types high on both the pleasure-seeking and pain-
avoidant polarities (e.g., mixed personality types; personalities with polarity reversals, such as 
aggrieved or dominant types; personality types whose adaptive strategies are defined more by the 
passive–active and other–self polarities than by the pain–pleasure polarity), and undifferentiated 
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Modes of Adaptation: The Passive–Active Polarity 
 
The passive–active polarity (Millon, 1990, pp. 64–77; 2003, pp. 14–18) is conceptualized 
in terms of ecological modification (active) and ecological accommodation (passive); that is, 
“whether initiative is taken in altering and shaping life’s events or whether behaviors are reactive 
to and accommodate those events” (Millon, 2003, p. 14). The reader is referred elsewhere 
(Millon 1990, pp. 64–77) for a detailed discussion of active–passive parallels in wider domains 
of psychological thought — for example, the “ego apparatuses” formulated by Heinz Hartmann 
(1939/1958) and the distinction between classical and operant conditioning in the writings of 
B. F. Skinner (1938, 1953), along with a consideration of the critical role of activation/arousal 
and its neurobiological substrates in describing affective and motivational states. 
 
Neurobiological Substrates of the Ecologically Accommodating  
and Ecologically Modifying Attributes.  
 
Neurobiological research has proven to be highly supportive of the activity or arousal 
construct ever since Papez (1937), Moruzzi and Magnum (1949), and MacLean (1949, 1952) 
assigned what were to be termed the reticular and limbic systems’ both energizing and 
expressive roles in the central nervous system. First among historic figures to pursue this theme 
was Ivan Pavlov. In speaking of the basic properties of the nervous system, Pavlov referred to 
the strength of the processes of excitation and inhibition, the equilibrium between their 
respective strengths, and the mobility of these processes. Although Pavlov’s (1927) theoretical 
formulations dealt with what Donald Hebb (1955) termed a conceptual nervous system, his 
experiments and those of his students led to innumerable direct investigations of brain activity. 
Central to Pavlov’s thesis was the distinction between strong and weak types of nervous systems 
— that is, high versus low tolerance and need for stimulation. 
 
Closely aligned to Pavlovian theory, Gray (1964) has asserted that those with a weak 
nervous system are easily aroused, nonsensation-seeking introverts who prefer to experience low 
rather than high levels of stimulation. Conversely, those with a strong nervous system would 
arouse slowly and likely be sensation-seeking extraverts who find low stimulation levels boring 
and high levels both exciting and pleasant. This assertion is supported by Eysenck’s revised, 
empirically validated arousal theory of extraversion–introversion (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985), 
based on the finding that introverts are more easily aroused (i.e., physiologically reactive) than 
extraverts, with the implication that they tend to seek lower levels of stimulation than do 
extraverts. (See also Zuckerman’s later, 1991, work on the relationships among the enzyme 
monoamine oxidase, neurotransmission, and sensation seeking.) 
 
Akin also to the active modality are the more recent views of Cloninger (1986, 1987). To 
him, novelty seeking is a heritable tendency toward excitement in response to novel stimuli or 
cues for reward (pleasure seeking) or punishment relief (pain avoidance), both of which lead to 
exploratory activity. Consonant with its correspondence to the activity polarity, individuals high 
in novelty seeking (associated with low levels of dopamine) may be characterized in their 
personality attributes as impulsive, excitable, and quickly distracted or bored. Conversely, 
passive individuals at the low end of the novelty-seeking dimension may be portrayed as 
reflective, stoic, slow-tempered, orderly, and only hesitantly engaged in new interests. 
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Personality Implications of the Passive–Active Polarity 
 
At the ecologically accommodating end of the passive–active continuum are personality 
adaptations that exhibit an excess of passivity. Several personality patterns demonstrate this 
passive style, although their passivity derives from and is expressed in appreciably different 
ways. Accommodating (e.g., dependent; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 330–331) 
personalities display a tendency to wait passively for others to provide nurturance, offer 
protection, and assume leadership, owing to deficits in confidence, initiative, and autonomous 
skills. Passivity among conscientious (e.g., obsessive-compulsive; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, 
pp. 513) personalities stems from their aversion to acting independently, because of intrapsychic 
resolutions they have made to quell troubling thoughts and emotions generated by their self–
other ambivalence. Ambitious (e.g., narcissistic; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 403–404) 
personalities presumptuously assume that they are unconditionally entitled to recognition and 
admiration, and that good things will come their way with little or no effort on their part. 
Retiring (e.g., schizoid; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 228–229) personalities are passive 
because of their relative incapacity to experience pleasure and pain. Aggrieved (e.g., self-
defeating; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, p. 584) personalities passively submit to others’ wishes; 
however, unlike the acquiescence of accommodating types, for aggrieved types submission to 
suffering represents a measure of personal control in that anguish is perceived as the most 
desirable alternative among the range of seemingly inescapable options available to them. 
 
At the ecologically modifying end of the passive–active continuum are personality 
adaptations that exhibit an excess of activity. Outgoing (e.g., histrionic; see Table 1 and Millon, 
1996, p. 366) personalities epitomize this tendency. These individuals achieve their goals of 
maximizing protection, nurturance, and reproductive success by energetically engaging in a 
series of manipulative, seductive, and attention-getting maneuvers. Approval and affection must 
constantly be replenished and are sought from every interpersonal source. Susceptible to 
boredom and intolerant of inactivity, they evince a restless, stimulus-seeking quality as they keep 
stirring up things, fleetingly enthusiastic about one activity after another. Ecological 
modification in dominant (e.g., aggressive; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 482–483) 
personalities is seen in the proactive manner in which they subjugate others (i.e., impose pain). A 
similarly active polarity focus is seen in reticent (e.g., avoidant; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, 
p. 260) personalities. The distinctive feature is the reticent personality’s anticipatory escape from 
pain, which presents as a hypervigilant awareness and active avoidance of situations that portend 
failure, rejection, denigration, or humiliation. Activity in contentious (e.g., negativistic; see Table 
1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 548–549) personalities is seen in a perpetual shifting in thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors, due to conflict and ambivalence between the self-enhancing and other-
nurturing polarities. 
 
Major personality theorists (e.g., Otto Kernberg, 1992) have noted strong similarities 
between the antisocial and narcissistic personality. The evolutionary model, with its polarity 
schema, clarifies the central distinctions between the dauntless (e.g., antisocial; see Table 1 and 
Millon, 1996, p. 444) and ambitious (e.g., narcissistic) personality patterns. Both patterns are low 
in pain avoidance and average in pleasure seeking, in conjunction with high self-enhancement 
and low other-nurturance. The key distinction between these personality patterns appears on the 
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passive–active dimension: Ecologically accommodating, ambitious, narcissistic personalities, 
with their characteristic sense of entitlement, assume that good things will come to them with 
minimal effort personal effort; ecologically modifying, sensation-seeking, dauntless personalities 
assume the contrary — that they are undervalued and that little will be achieved without 
considerable effort on their part (including Machiavellian cunning and deception, should such 
means serve their aggrandizing ends). 
 
Political Implications of the Passive–Active Polarity 
 
The passive–active dimension provides evolutionary underpinnings for Barber’s (1992) 
fourfold (active/passive × positive/negative) categorization of presidential character, in which 
activity–passivity is described in terms of energy invested in political office. In evolutionary 
terms, a passive orientation can be construed as “a tendency to accommodate to a given 
ecological niche and accept what the environment offers,” whereas an active orientation may be 
construed as “a tendency to modify or intervene in the environment, thereby adapting it to 
oneself” (Millon & Davis, 2000, p. 59). 
 
The passive–active dimension also provides an evolutionary basis for Lloyd Etheredge’s 
(1978) fourfold (high/low dominance × introversion/extraversion) classification of personality-
based differences in foreign-policy operating style and role orientation. High-dominance 
introverts (bloc or excluding leaders such as Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Hoover) actively seek 
to reshape the world, typically by means of containment policies or by tenaciously advancing a 
personal vision. High-dominance extraverts (world or integrating leaders such as Theodore 
Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson) actively seek to 
reshape the world through advocacy and pragmatic leadership on a wide range of foreign-policy 
fronts. Low-dominance introverts (maintainers such as Calvin Coolidge) tend to persevere with 
the existing order, passively pursuing a foreign policy that amounts to “a holding action for the 
status quo.” Low-dominance extraverts (conciliators such as William McKinley, William Taft, 
Warren Harding, Harry Truman, and Dwight D. Eisenhower), though revealing a preference for 
passively accommodating to existing arrangements, are more flexible and open to change, 
tending “to respond to circumstances with the sympathetic hope that accommodations can be 
negotiated” (Etheredge, 1978, pp. 449–450). 
 
Finally, in Hermann’s (1980, 1987) conceptual scheme, a core belief contributing to a 
leader’s worldview, along with nationalism, is the belief in one’s own ability to control events. In 
evolutionary terms, a more efficacy-oriented, internal locus of control implies an 
active-modifying motivating aim, in contrast to a more external locus of control, which suggests 
a passive-accommodating mode of adaptation. Hermann’s (1987) expansionist, active-
independent, and influential orientations are more actively oriented, whereas her 
mediator/integrator, opportunist, and developmental orientations are more passively oriented. 
The likely personality correlates of these leadership and policy orientations are easily inferred 
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Strategies of Replication: The Other–Self Polarity 
 
Somewhat less profound but no less fundamental than the first two polarities, the two-
dimensional other–self polarity (Millon, 1990, pp. 77–98; 2003, pp. 18–24) is conceptualized in 
terms of, respectively, reproductive nurturance (other) and reproductive propagation (self) — a 
nurturing tendency to value the needs of others, versus an individuating self-orientation that 
seeks to realize personal potentials before attending to the needs of others (Millon, 1994, p. 6; 
2003, pp. 18–19). Evolutionary biologists (e.g., Cole, 1954; Wallen & Schneider, 2000) have 
recorded marked differences among species in both the cycle and pattern of their reproductive 
behaviors. Within most animal species an important distinction may be drawn between male and 
female genders (Daly & Wilson, 1983; Mealey, 2000; Trivers, 1972); it is this latter 
differentiation that undergirds what has been termed the self- versus other-oriented polarity. 
 
Males lean toward being self-oriented, because their competitive advantages maximize 
the replication of their genes. Conversely, females lean toward being other-oriented, because 
their competence in nurturing and protecting their limited progeny maximizes the replication of 
their genes. The consequence of the male strategy is a broad range of what may be seen as self-
oriented behaviors, such as acting in an egotistic, insensitive, inconsiderate, uncaring, and 
minimally communicative manner. In contrast, the female strategy engenders a disposition to be 
other-oriented, affiliative, intimate, empathic, protective, communicative, and solicitous 
(Gilligan, 1982; Rushton, 1985; E. O. Wilson, 1978). It bears note, however, that these 
conceptually derived self–other extremes do not evince themselves in sharp and distinct gender 
differences (Hyde, 1996; Mealey, 2000). Such proclivities are matters of degree; consequently, 
most individuals exhibit intermediate characteristics on this, as well as on the other polarity sets. 
 
The reiteration of the polar dimension of replication in diverse psychological domains 
(e.g., internal versus external locus of control of reinforcement, self structures versus object 
relations, and competitive versus cooperative dispositions of motivation, along with the 
neurobiological substrates of gender) has been elaborated elsewhere (Millon, 1990, pp. 77–98). 
 
Neurobiological Substrates of the Other-Nurturing and Self-Enhancing Attributes 
 
Researchers seeking to identify specific substrates that may relate to the other-oriented 
polarities have offered intriguing data and ideas. In what has been termed the 
affiliation/attachment drive, George Everly (1988), for example, has provided evidence favoring 
an anatomic role for the cingulate gyrus. Referring to the work of Henry and Stephens (1977), 
MacLean (1985), and Steklis and Kling (1985), Everly concluded that the ablation of the 
cingulate eliminates both affiliative and grooming behaviors. The proximal physiology of this 
drive has been hypothesized as including serotonergic, noradrenergic, and opioid 
neurotransmission systems (Everly 1988; Redmond, Maas, Kling, Graham, & Dekirmenjian, 
1971). MacLean (1985) has argued that the affiliative drive may be phylogenically coded in the 
limbic system and may undergird the concept of family in primates. Indeed, the drive toward 
other-oriented behaviors — such as attachment, nurturing, affection, reliability, and collaborative 
play — has been characterized as the “cement of society” by Henry and Stephens (1977); see 
also Carter, Lederhendler, and Kirkpatrick (1999). 
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At the self-oriented pole, Everly (1988) has proposed an autonomy/aggression biological 
substrate that manifests itself in a strong need for control and dominance as well as in 
hierarchical status striving. Although the evidence remains somewhat equivocal, norepinephrine 
and dopamine seem to be the prime neurotransmitters of this drive; the hormone testosterone ap-
pears similarly implicated (Feldman & Quenzar, 1984; Mazur & Booth, 1998). 
 
Personality Implications of the Other–Self Polarity 
 
In the other-nurturing quadrant of the two-dimensional other–self polarity are personality 
adaptations that exhibit a distinctively interdependent orientation and an external locus of 
control. Several personality patterns demonstrate this other-oriented style of self-denial, where 
self-actualizing autonomy is relinquished in favor of gaining the approbation of others. 
Accommodating (e.g., dependent; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 330–331) and outgoing (e.g., 
histrionic; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, p. 366) personalities have learned that feelings 
associated with pleasure or the avoidance of pain — that is, their personal sense safety and 
security — are provided almost exclusively as a function of their relationships with others. 
Behaviorally, these persons display a strong need for external support (accommodating 
personalities) and attention (outgoing personalities); when deprived of affection, nurturance, and 
approval, they experience marked discomfort, if not sadness and anxiety. A centering on the 
wishes of others and denial of self is also seen in conscientious (e.g., obsessive-compulsive; see 
Table 1 and Millon, 1996, p. 513) personalities. These persons display a picture of social 
compliance and interpersonal respect; however, beneath the veneer of conformity, they 
experience an intense desire to assert themselves. Managing this pervasive ambivalence requires 
rigid psychological controls, which leads to physical tensions that may find periodic relief in 
abrupt emotional outbursts directed at subordinates. Aggrieved (e.g., self-defeating; see Table 1 
and Millon, 1996, p. 584) personalities, like conscientious and dependent types, are weak on the 
self-enhancement polarity; the key distinction is that they are not nearly as strong on other-
nurturing, ranking only average on this polarity. 
 
In the self-enhancing quadrant of the two-dimensional other–self polarity are personality 
adaptations that exhibit a distinctively individualistic orientation and an internal locus of control. 
In ambitious (e.g., narcissistic; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 403–404) personalities, 
psychogenesis reflects the acquisition of a self-image of exceptional worth. Providing self-
rewards is highly gratifying if one values oneself or possesses either a real or inflated sense of 
self-worth. Beneath their manifest confidence and, in more extreme cases, arrogance and an 
exploitive egocentricity, these individuals believe they already possess what is most important — 
themselves; thus, they experience primary pleasure simply by passively being or attending to 
selfish needs, without much thought or even conscious intent, and benignly exploiting others to 
their own advantage. Although validation of others is both welcome and encouraged, their 
admirable self-concept requires little confirmation through social approval or, in more extreme 
cases, genuine accomplishment. Dauntless (e.g., antisocial; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, 
p. 444) personalities are skeptical about the motives of others, whom they judge to be unreliable, 
if not disloyal. To counter indifference or the expectation of pain from others, they strive for 
autonomy; in more extreme cases, they may actively engage in duplicitous behaviors and 
shamelessly exploit others for self-gain — which, from their strongly self-enhancing perspective, 
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is simply just revenge for perceived past injustices. Dominant (e.g., aggressive; see Table 1 and 
Millon, 1996, p. 482–483) personalities are similar to ambitious and dauntless types in their 
weakness on the other-nurturing polarity; the key distinction in replication strategy is that they 
are considerably less self-enhancing than these types, ranking only average on this polarity. Both 
contentious (e.g., negativistic; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 548–549) and retiring (e.g., 
schizoid; see Table 1 and Millon, 1996, pp. 228–229) personalities are weak on the other-
nurturing polarity; however, though self-involved, they are not self-enhancing, ranking only 
average on this polarity. Finally, for some types, such as reticent (e.g., avoidant; see Table 1 and 
Millon, 1996, p. 260) personalities — intermediate on both the self-enhancing and other-
nurturing polarities — the role of self versus other is of minimal consequence with regard to 
personality adaptation. 
 
Political Implications of the Other–Self Polarity 
 
The other–self polarity provides one of the most clear-cut illustrations of the heuristic 
value of evolutionary theory in politics. Although humans can be both other-encouraging and 
self-enhancing, most persons will likely tend toward one side or the other. A balance that 
coordinates the two provides a satisfactory answer to the question of whether one should be 
devoted to the support and welfare of others (in American politics, the underlying philosophy of 
the predominantly liberal Democratic Party) or fashion one’s life in accord with one’s own needs 
and desires (in American politics, the underlying philosophy of the predominantly conservative 
Republican Party). More specifically, evolutionary theory predicts that in terms of party-political 
preference, women, in addition to accommodating and outgoing personalities generally (as noted 
earlier), should disproportionately favor more liberal policy positions and the Democratic Party; 
men, in contrast, should favor more conservative policies and the Republican Party (cf. Miller, 
1996). 
 
With reference to political leadership, three social motives (which in Hermann’s 
conceptual scheme are postulated to contribute to a leader’s worldview) are thought to play a key 
role in leader performance: need for power, need for achievement, and need for affiliation 
(Winter, 1987, 1998). In evolutionary terms, the need for power, involving “the desire to control, 
influence, or have an impact on other persons or groups” (Hermann, 1987, p. 167), suggests a 
self-enhancing replication strategy, as does the need for achievement, which involves “a concern 
for excellence” and personal accomplishment (Winter, 1998, p. 369). Conversely, the need for 
affiliation, reflecting “concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring warm and friendly 
relations with other persons or groups” (Hermann, 1987, p. 167), suggests an other-nurturing 
replication strategy. Hermann’s (1987) expansionist, active-independent, and influential 
leadership orientations are more self-oriented, whereas her mediator/integrator, opportunist, and 
developmental orientations are more other-oriented. 
 
Hermann (1980) also posits two key elements of interpersonal style that, in conjunction 
with decision style, shape a leader’s personal political style: distrust of others and task 
orientation (see Hermann, 1987, pp. 163, 167). In evolutionary terms, the trust–distrust and task–
relationship dimensions of leadership are easily reconceptualized as surface manifestations of 
the other–self polarity. 
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The two key elements of decision style in Hermann’s (1980) framework are conceptual 
complexity and self-confidence, which she construes (following Ziller, Stone, Jackson, & 
Terbovic, 1977), as jointly determinative of “how ideological or pragmatic a political leader will 
be” (Hermann, 1987, p. 164). Stone and Baril (1979), elaborating on the findings of Ziller et al. 
(1977), used self–other orientation as a conceptual basis for postulating two distinctive political 
prototypes, each having a different motivational base. The pragmatist — akin to Barber’s (1965) 
active–negative Advertiser — is motivated by power seeking to compensate for low self-esteem 
(as anticipated by Harold Lasswell, 1948), being driven by self-enhancement and self-promotion. 
The second political personality type, the ideologue — akin to Barber’s (1965) active–positive 
Lawmaker — is more other-oriented, apparently having a sincere interest in good legislation 
(defined as either pursuing ideological goals or as serving a constituency). Stone and Baril’s 
(1979) construal of self- and other-oriented political personality types, in concert with Barber’s 
(1965, 1992) scheme, lends empirical and theoretical support for the utility of the other–self 
polarity in an overarching theory of political personality and performance. 
 
The likely personality correlates of these leadership and policy orientations are readily 





Of all the attribute domains we consider critical for assessing and describing personality across 
the entire matrix of the person — the behavioral domains of expressive behavior and 
interpersonal conduct; the phenomenological domains of cognitive style, self-image, and object 
representations; the intrapsychic domains of regulatory mechanisms and morphological 
organization; and the biophysical domain of mood/temperament (Clark & Watson, 1999; 
Immelman, 1993, 2003; Millon, 1990, 1996) — mood/temperament emerges as the 
personological domain most firmly rooted in neurobiology. This is hardly surprising, given that 
mood/temperament is situated at the biophysical level of analysis (see Immelman, 2003, p. 611; 
Millon, 1996, p. 138). 
 
From a neuroscientific perspective, temperament — and emotion more generally — 
clearly comprises the core of personality inquiry. Anticipating the inception of political 
psychology as an organized discipline in 1978, International Society of Political Psychology 
(ISPP) founder Jeanne Knutson called for greater recognition of The Human Basis of the Polity 
(1972). That goal having been achieved, political-psychological inquiry in the third decade of the 
ISPP, and beyond, will increasingly zero in on the affective bases of political cognition and 
behavior. Correspondingly, in the currently emerging postcognitive era it would be a grave 
mistake for personality-in-politics inquiry to ignore the neurobiological and evolutionary 
foundations of political personality and leadership. 
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